Estimating the costs and benefits of local government reorganisation by Choi, Young-Chool & Lee, Sang-Yeup
econstor
Make Your Publication Visible
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Choi, Young-Chool; Lee, Sang-Yeup
Conference Paper
Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Local
Government Reorganisation: A Case of Korea
46th Congress of the European Regional Science Association: "Enlargement, Southern
Europe and the Mediterranean", August 30th - September 3rd, 2006, Volos, Greece
Provided in Cooperation with:
European Regional Science Association (ERSA)
Suggested Citation: Choi, Young-Chool; Lee, Sang-Yeup (2006) : Estimating the Costs and
Benefits of Local Government Reorganisation: A Case of Korea, 46th Congress of the European
Regional Science Association: "Enlargement, Southern Europe and the Mediterranean", August
30th - September 3rd, 2006, Volos, Greece
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118284
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
   
 
 Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Local 
Government Reorganisation: A case of Korea 
 
 
By Young-Chool Choi(Professor, Department of Public 
Administration, Chungbuk National University, Korea) and 
Sang-Yeup Lee(Professor, Department of Public 
Administration, Hanseo University, Korea) 
 
 
 1
   
Estimating the Costs and Benefits of Local Government 
Reorganisation: A Case of Korea 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper intends to bridge the gap between current levels of analysis and what is 
required for an accurate appraisal to be made of local government reorganisation. In it, 
we introduce the result of a research project conducted in relation to a local authority 
reorganisation plan implemented in Korea. The initiative seeks to create a unitary 
local authority replacing one first-tier and four second-tier local authorities within the 
first tier, in the hope of reducing the cost of providing services and also of making 
local authorities more competitive. First, we outline the local government 
reorganisation process in Jeju Province in Korea. Second, we describe the research 
strategy employed to estimate the costs and benefits associated with local government 
reorganisation, and then we introduce the results of the analysis. The research process 
described here gives us information about what should be included in the categories 
of costs and benefits, and what methodologies can be applied in estimating these. The 
analysis shows that the benefits resulting from reorganisation are much greater than 
the costs in the longer term. It also emphasises that the methodologies by which non-
market goods, such as satisfaction with area-wide problem solution and loss of 
regional identity, can be valued should also be employed to estimate non-market 
benefits and costs arising from local government reorganisation.  
 
 
I   Introduction 
 
Local government reorganisation is not solely a phenomenon of the West, or of 
contemporary Korea. In Korea, it has periodically been proposed by politicians or 
academics as a means whereby local authorities can cope with administrative 
inefficiency, regional conflicts between the neighbouring local authorities, area-wide 
problems and administrative duplication. In Korea, in recent times in particular there 
have been two significant periods in which local government reorganisation has been 
attempted. The first was 1995−2000, when the 90 neighbouring city and rural local 
authorities were merged into 40 local authorities. The second major merger is 
occurring now, in a province called Jeju Province. The aim is to convert one first-tier 
provincial authority (similar to county government in the UK) and four second-tier 
local authorities (similar to district government in the UK) within provincial 
government into one unitary local authority. 1  The difference between the two 
attempts is that the first represents the consolidation of two or three neighbouring city 
or rural local authorities without any change in the tier system, while the second 
entails the creation of a unitary local authority in which the one first-tier local 
authority and the four second-tier local authorities within it can be converted to a 
single unitary local authority. If it is created, there will be only one level of municipal 
                                                 
1 The Korean Government has stated that it intends to convert the existing 250 local authorities into 80 
or 90 unitary local authorities in 2010, eliminating one tier between central and local government. 
Ruling and opposition parties in Korea all agree about this, because they believe that the existing local 
government tier and boundary system has caused inefficient public service delivery and, more 
importantly, election-related regional conflict.  
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government across the entire geographical area, and all municipal services become the 
responsibility of this newly created authority. In addition, there will be only one 
political body responsible for making decisions. In this respect, the recent attempt at 
local government reorganisation is more influential in terms of ripple effect, and more 
politically and socially controversial in terms of local autonomy discourse. 
 
Since the local government reorganisation process necessitates conflict among the 
interested parties, it is important to estimate objectively and scientifically the costs 
and benefits incurred in making the changes, to let ordinary citizens know these, and 
to let them on this basis decide whether they are in favour of the existing system or of 
a newly designed unitary local authority. Up until now, there have been very few 
significant studies of these issues.  
 
The purpose of this paper is not to give a detailed description of the steps involved in 
estimating the costs and savings arising from the local government restructuring, but 
to introduce the results of the empirical analysis regarding the potential creation of a 
unitary authority in Jeju Province in Korea. The methodological process is depicted in 
a simple way, based on a research project conducted by a team commissioned by the 
provincial government, that is, Jeju Government in Korea. 
 
Having these backgrounds in mind, this paper (i) presents the methods employed in 
the analysis of the costs and benefits involved in the restructuring process in Jeju 
Province in Korea, (ii) demonstrates the results of an analysis of the costs and benefits 
associated with the potential reorganisation of the one provincial authority and the 
four second-tier local authorities under the province, and (iii) puts forward some 
policy implications for other countries engaged in the restructuring of local authorities.  
 
 
II   Overview of the local government reorganisation process  
 
Local government reorganisation is by definition a process by which  
Although Sancton (2003) points out that local government reorganisation is the 
exception rather than the contemporary trend, noting that since 1990, it has occurred 
only in some countries like the UK, New Zeland and Canada. However,  even though 
it is not prevailing trend worldwide as Sancton indicated, in reality it has happened in 
other countries like the US and Germany as well, in the name of city-county 
consolidation and unitary authority or so.  
 
 
Local government reorganisation including consolidation of the neighbouring local 
authorities has been periodically proposed as a means for local governments to cope 
with declining revenues or poor service delivery. The crucial benefit of local 
government reorganisation is typically argued to be gains from scale economies 
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At present, there are in Korea 16 first-tier local authorities2 (7 metropolitan authorities 
and 9 provincial authorities), and 234 city and rural local authorities (75 city 
authorities, 90 rural local authorities, and 69 metropolitan borough authorities within 
the 7 metropolitan authorities) which are second-tier. This is the result of the city–
rural district consolidation scheme, which had lasted from 1995 to 2000. According to 
The Special Act on City–Rural District Consolidation, the neighbouring city and rural 
districts can be merged into one bigger local authority following a referendum of the 
voters within the two areas; and as a result, as was mentioned earlier, the 40 
consolidated local authorities were created, with financial incentives from central 
government. Up until now, however, there has been no case, in Korea, of the creation 
of a unitary local authority, partly because the two-tier, province–district system has 
been embedded in Korean administrative culture for more than 500 years, and partly 
because politicians and officials, even in central government, had not attempted local 
government reorganisation accompanying tier-change, since they know that tier-
change reform provokes powerful and indeed uncountable resistance from local 
politicians, and local government employees in particular. The present government, 
which came to office in 2003, also knows that local government reorganisation 
incurring tier-change would be politically burdensome and administratively difficult 
to implement. However, the Government, which has been focusing on 
decentralisation and government innovation since it came to power, has decided to 
support Jeju Province in its move to become a unitary local authority with more 
autonomous power and special status, in the hope that if such an authority is created, 
it will become more competitive, both economically and socially. Table 1 shows the 
main characteristics of Jeju Province. 
Because the current Act on Local Autonomy stipulates that a local government tier and 
its jurisdiction can be merged, reorganised or altered by a referendum of the 
electorates within their boundaries, and also that the provincial authority can take 
upon itself the whole process, the Jeju provincial authority has been in the process of 
restructuring one province and four local authorities into one unitary authority since 
2003.  
Table 1 General description of Jeju Province (budget unit: one hundred million won in 
Korean currency) 
 Area (km2) Population Number of local 
government 
employees 
Budget 
Jeju Province 1,848 553,864 1,398 11,287 
Jeju City 256 292,908 980 5,266 
Seogwipo City 255 83,525 568 2,850 
Bukjeju gun 722 102,189 639 3,618 
Namjeju gun 615 75,242 562 3,209 
Total 1,848 553,864 4,147 26,233 
                                                 
2 In Korea, provincial governments basically serve as an intermediary between the central and city 
governments. Thus, their administrative systems are smaller versions of the central government’s 
system. City and rural governments deliver services to the residents through an administrative system. 
Provincial governors and mayors of district (city and rural) authorities are elected every four years, 
directly by constituents. Each city and rural government has several administrative units which serve as 
field offices for handling the needs of their constituents. 
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Source: Jeju Statistics 2004. 
Note 1. Gun means rural district. 
Note 2. The exchange rate of Korean currency to English sterling is approximately 2000: 1 as of 5 
July 2005. 
As Table 1 shows, the whole population of the provincial area is around five hundred 
and fifty thousand. The total number of local government employees is about forty-
one thousand, and of these, 1,398 persons belong to the provincial government while 
around 2,700 work for four district governments. Regarding the budget, about 40 per 
cent of the total budget is spent by the provincial government and 60 per cent is spent 
by the four district governments. What should be noted here is that because its area 
(containing as few as 550,000 residents) has one provincial and four district 
governments in a two-tier government, the number of local government employees 
and the size of budget contrasts significantly with those of other local authorities 
whose legal status is district, not provincial, and which at the same time have more 
residents than does the whole of Jeju Province. This is because in Korea, once a local 
entity has gained the legal status of a local government, it is legally entitled to have an 
internal administrative and political system to provide local public services. Table 2 
shows how the area of Jeju Province contrasts with that of a typical city in terms of 
budget size and number of employees. 
Table 2 Comparative characteristics of Jeju provincial area and other cities (as of the end of 
2004) 
 Population Budget Employees Councillors 
Jeju provincial 
area 
553,864 26,233 4,147 57 
 City 
A(Cheongju) 
626,000 6,293 1,660 25 
City B(Suweon) 1,023,000 12,265,0002,412 2,412 40 
     
Note: Figures for the Jeju Province area are the aggregate of the figures of the one provincial and four 
district governments. 
As we see in Table 2, the area of Jeju Province has a much greater budget, and many 
more employees and councillors, than two district cities, even though its population is 
less. The reason is that it consists of a two-tier system, and therefore it has one 
provincial and four district authorities, each having their own councils and employees. 
This indicates that, from an economic point of view, Jeju Province has legally spent 
much more of its budget and employed many more employees than other districts. It 
also signifies that, from an administrative point of view, much of the work carried out 
in the Jeju Province area has been carried out in duplicate form. For these reasons, 
many experts have argued that the two-tier system should be replaced by a one-tier 
unitary authority system, and in this respect Jeju Province can be seen as a pilot. 
Since the initiative to reorganise the Jeju provincial and district authorities into one 
unitary authority was made public, Jeju provincial authority has commissioned a team 
of professional scholars and experts to conduct a research project aimed at identifying 
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the potential costs and benefits associated with the restructuring of the one province 
and four districts into one unitary local authority. The project was completed in 
September 2004. After workshops, followed by the publication of the project report in 
2004 and the subsequent public hearings, the provincial authority decided, on 27 July 
2005, to hold a referendum to determine the future of the unitary local authority. The 
referendum held on that day revealed that 57.03% (82,919) of voters were in favour of 
the creation of the new unitary authority and 42.97% (62,469) opposed to it. Since the 
referendum was in favour of reorganisation, central government and Jeju provincial 
government have since undertaken administrative and legal work prior to the 
launching of a new unitary authority on 1 January 2007.  
 
III   Research strategy 
 
Is there such a thing as economy of scale? What costs and benefits may result from 
local government reorganisation, and how can they be measured? To answer these 
questions, we need above all to examine the taken arguments relating to local 
government reorganisation such as consolidation (here involving consolidation and 
annexation). Many theoretical studies have been conducted regarding the merits and 
demerits of consolidation and local government reorganisation. 
 
According to some experts (Carey et al., 1996; Hirsch, 1970; Bunch and Strauss, 
1992; Sancton, 2003; Municipal Research & Service Centre of Washington, 2005), 
local government reorganisation gives rise to cost savings from scale economics, 
simplification of government bureaucracies and services, elimination of duplication of 
functions and services, fast processing of administrative matters referred between 
local and central government, sharing of facilities such as sports stadia and cemeteries, 
and savings in personnel expenses. These experts argue that small size generally 
means that individual jurisdictions cannot benefit from possible economies of scale in 
the provision of various public services, though it can also mean that service provision, 
though more expensive, is more responsive to residents’ needs. Furthermore, recent 
studies in Korea suggest that consolidation also benefits local economic development 
and the comprehensive planning of land use.  
By contrast, others (Hong, 1997; Park, 1999; Rausch, 2005) argue that local 
government reorganisation causes loss of regional identity, weakening of regional 
representation, and the relocation in rural districts of unwelcome and disliked 
facilities such as the sewerage system and crematorium facilities. The Municipal 
Research & Services Center of Washington (2005) indicates that one of the problems 
local government reorganisation causes is loss of the community’s ‘rural character’, 
and this may cause opposition, from local politicians in particular. The UK 
experiences with reorganisation also point out that the issue of community identity 
figured prominently in the early stages of the Local Government Review (Cope et al., 
1997).  
There are, then, pros and cons to local government reorganisation. In the light of this, 
what is crucial is to conceptualise and then quantify the potential benefits and costs 
which local government reorganisation can produce. 
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Most research conducted in the UK on the benefits and costs associated with local 
government reorganisation has focused primarily on costs rather than on savings or 
benefits. For example, Chisholm (2000, 2002, 2004) emphasises the fact that 
transition costs involved in changing the structure of local government in the 1990s 
have been seriously underestimated, and that the claimed savings prove hard or even 
impossible to identify. However, his research does not deal with the potential savings 
involved in reorganisation, only the potential costs. In addition, in the UK, the 
financial model produced by PriceWaterhouseCoopers, to which the government 
guidance refers, develops the concept of the ‘cost of being in business’ and subdivides 
the cost into ‘corporate and democratic costs’ and ‘service strategy costs’ 
(www.boundarycommittee.org.uk/ourwork/LocalGovReviews.cfm). 
 
The Government’s model is too crude, and does not cover the total costs and benefits 
of reorganisation. It should be able to quantify the expected costs and benefits as well 
as the transition costs and ongoing costs. As Chisholm (2004: 119) has pointed out, in 
using the PWC model, and by referring to the future impact of policy decisions on 
new unitary local councils, the Boundary Committee for England has implicitly 
turned its back on any estimation of transition costs and has accepted an inadequate 
basis for comparing ongoing costs. It is regrettable that Chisholm does not mention 
the importance of the estimation of the savings or benefits arising from the 
reorganisation. 
On the other hand, it appears that the UK Government has emphasised that recurrent 
savings may accrue when the costs of creating a new unitary authority are compared 
with the pre-existing costs (Chisholm, 2004: 18). No methodologies exist that are 
sophisticated enough to measure them. It appears that, in the UK, no significant 
documents have been provided in which the costs and benefits involved in local 
government reorganisation are estimated systematically, implying that the electorates 
living in the areas in question have not been able to ascertain what exactly 
reorganisation will bring to them. As a result, they may have been influenced by the 
biased information given out by the interested parties. 
In this context, it is essential that we attempt to identify the costs and benefits 
associated with the reorganisation and quantify them. Table 3 and Figure 1 explain the 
benefits and costs to be analysed in this study.  
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m ic variables
 
 
 
<Figure 1> Analytical framework  
 
 
<Table 3> Methodologies to be employed for the study 
 
 
 Research focus Methods employed Remarks
Economy of 
scale 
Least-cost population size Curve-fitting analysis 
Personnel expenses Multiple regression analysis 
Running costs Multiple regression analysis 
Election costs Multiple regression analysis 
Prevention of duplicate 
investment 
Documentary analysis and 
multiple regression analysis 
Prevention of overlapped 
projects 
Documentary analysis and 
regression analysis 
Benefits 
Reduction of processing time Documentary analysis, 
interview, regression 
analysis 
Costs to re-enact regulations Documentary analysis 
Costs of rearranging documents Documentary analysis and 
regression analysis 
Costs of restructuring 
organisational structure 
Documentary analysis and 
interview 
Costs of publicising new 
authority 
interview 
Costs of replacing road 
signposts 
Documentary analysis 
Costs 
Costs of loss of community 
identity 
Choice Experiments 
Benefit-
Cost 
analysis 
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Benefits-Costs Total net benefits  
Production multiplier effect 
Employment multiplier effect 
Regional 
Development 
Effects Income multiplier effect 
Input-Output Analysis 
   
 
 
The potential costs and benefits resulting from reorganisation, and the methodologies 
employed to measure them, can be summarised under a number of headings, as 
follows. 
 
1   Economy of scale? 
Does economy of scale exist in local government service provision in Korea? If so, 
which population size in local government involves the lowest cost? Curve fitting, 
known as regression analysis, was employed to identify whether economy of scale 
existed in each service area and, if so, to find out which population size involved the 
lowest cost. By means of this analysis, we can determine the ‘best fit’ line or curve for 
the average cost per person of local government service provision. 
2   Benefits 
Benefits can be derived from the following six kinds of savings.  
□ Savings of personnel expenses 
Each local authority has its own personnel expenses for local government employees, 
and these expenses normally depend on the area size and population size of each local 
authority, the degree of its financial autonomy, and other factors. Using regression 
analysis of data for a total of 234 district authorities in Korea, regression equations 
can be derived, via which the personnel expenses of the potential unitary local 
authority under observation can be estimated. For example, if we assume that the 
degree of personnel expense increases by area size, population size and degree of 
financial autonomy, we can determine the regression equation and line which can tell 
us which variable best predicts the size of personnel; we can then also predict the 
personnel expenses of any local authority provided that we know the area size, 
population size and degree of financial autonomy of the authority in question. In this 
paper, we will adopt multiple regression analysis for estimating the savings in 
personnel expenses. 
 
□ Savings of running costs 
Similarly, multiple regression analysis will be employed to measure the savings of 
running costs arising from the restructuring. 
 
□ Savings of election costs 
The number of electoral wards to be reduced, the legal expenses for the election of 
each candidate, the potential number of candidates in each ward, and number of 
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elections projected during the next ten years will be estimated. Multiple regression 
analysis will also be employed. 
 
□ Savings from prevention of duplicate investment in public facilities (e.g. crematoria, 
sports stadia) 
Information about the type of public facilities (e.g. crematoria, sports stadia) which 
ordinary local authorities can share with each other, the number and capacity of the 
public facilities the five local authorities have, the optimum capacity of the public 
facilities which the ordinary local authorities have, and other related information, will 
be included in the estimation of savings. 
 
□ Savings from prevention of duplicated projects 
The type, size and nature of the projects implemented by the five local authorities 
during the previous year will be analysed. 
 
□ Effect of reduction of time spent in processing customer services 
A comparative analysis will be made of the time spent in processing customer 
services through a two-tier system and the time spent in a single-tier system. 
 
3   Costs 
Costs can also be derived from the following kinds of potential losses. 
 
□ Costs to re-enact a new unitary authority’s ordinances, regulations, rules, etc. 
The estimated total number of the ordinances, regulations and rules which a 
potentially created unitary local authority might entail, the average time spent in 
enacting a given regulation, and the average unit cost will be considered in the 
estimation of costs. 
 
□ Costs of rearranging official documents and archives 
The estimated time spent in rearranging the official documents and archives, and the 
unit cost spent in rearranging a document, will be considered. 
 
□ Costs of restructuring new unitary authority organisational structure 
The costs involved in diagnosing the potential unitary authority will be considered. 
 
□ Costs of publicising new unitary authority to residents 
The costs of publicising the creation of the unitary authority in local daily newspapers 
and television broadcasts will be included in the analysis. 
 
□ Costs of replacing road signposts with newly named ones 
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The costs of replacing existing road signs will also be included. 
 
□ Costs of loss of community identity  
The costs of the loss of community identity which residents within the area might 
experience will be examined. For this analysis, choice experiments (CE) will be 
employed. In a CE, individuals are given a hypothetical setting and asked to make a 
choice among several alternatives in a choice set, and they are usually asked to 
perform a sequence of such choices (Alpizar et al., 2001: 84). Hence, CEs can be 
useful tools for valuing non-market goods in the areas of local government 
reorganisation (Willis, 2002). Valuation of non-market goods has been neglected in 
the estimation of the benefits and costs connected with reorganisation. The research 
project conducted for Jeju Province applied the CE method to assess qualitatively 
related non-market goods, including satisfaction with area-wide problem solutions, 
satisfaction with the faster processing of customer services such as licence and 
planning permission, and loss of local identity and political representation (see Jeju 
Development Institute, 2004). 
  
4   Regional development effects 
The regional Input–Output table plays a crucial role in predicting the effect of 
investment by an industrial sector on the other sectors. If benefits exceed costs, we 
can assume that the difference can be reinvested within the newly created unitary 
authority. Supposing it is invested in the construction area among other areas, the 
regional development effects equal the three effects (production multiplier effect, 
employment multiplier effect, and income multiplier effect) which can arise from the 
investment of the exceeded benefits in construction. In this research, we estimate the 
effects of the local government restructuring on regional development, on the 
assumption that the savings arising from it are invested in the construction area within 
the region. Since the regional development effects can be classed as three − 
production, employment and income − the effects will also be presented respectively 
by regional Input–Output analysis: 
 
□ Production multiplier effect 
The effects on regional production of the savings arising from the reorganisation. 
 
□ Employment multiplier effect 
The effects on regional employment of the savings arising from the reorganisation. 
 
□ Income multiplier effect 
The effects on regional income of the savings arising from the reorganisation. 
Benefits and costs stretch out over time. In this estimation, the time period for 
measurement is assumed to be ten years (2007−16). Since individuals tend to prefer 
the present to the future, and since human preferences are paramount, this ‘present 
orientation’ can be accounted for. Future benefits and costs are therefore discounted, 
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at a particular ‘discount rate’ (Pearce, 1998: 87). In this research, however, we do not 
discount the discount rate in considering the annual rate of the price increase. 
 
IV   Analysis and discussion 
 
1   Data 
 
Socio-economic data for all the local authorities in Korea are from the Local 
Government Finance Yearbook 2004 published by the Ministry of Government 
Administration and Home Affairs, and the official documents and data which were 
used to estimate the costs and savings in areas such as duplicated projects were 
derived from the Jeju provincial authority and the four district authorities. Data for CE 
were collected from 810 local residents living in Jeju Province by the Stated 
Preference questionnaire method. Data for the regional Input–Output analysis were 
derived from Regional Input–Output Statistics 2004, published by Korea Bank. 
 
 
2   Empirical results and discussion 
 
(1) Economy of scale 
 
Here, we are concerned with how costs vary according to local government 
population. In order to identify whether an economy of scale exists in local 
government service provision in Korea, and if so which population size involves the 
lowest cost, curve-fitting analysis was applied.  
 
Those who are against the creation of a large single-tier governing structure argue that 
the least costly and most efficient size of government may differ for different 
services; that is, efficiency and cost savings may be different for transport than for 
social services. In other words, some services may benefit from economies of scale 
(lower cost per unit) if assigned to larger units of government, while other services 
may suffer from diseconomies of scale (higher cost per unit). Therefore, statistics 
detailing the average cost per person for 21 subdivided budget items in 234 district 
local authorities were utilised as a dependent variable for curve fitting, and the 
population size of local government was taken as the independent variable.  
 
Figure 2 shows that a dependent variable (ptotal), which is the average total budget 
per person in local authorities, varies according to variation in an independent 
variable (popula). Total budget per person in local authorities (ptotal) is high when the 
population size of local authorities (popula) is small (below 200,000), is lowest when 
population size is around 600,000, and increases again as population size increases 
above 600,000. Thus we can say that economy of scale does exist in service provision 
in Korean local government. Equally, Figure 2 shows that the budget per person for 
special projects in local authorities also varies as the population size of local 
government varies. Likewise, a further 19 budget items were also analysed and the 
results are presented in Table 4. 
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Figure 2   Curve-fitting analysis result graph (ptotal) (population unit: one thousand) 
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Figure 3   Curve-fitting analysis result (pproject) (population unit: one thousand) 
 
 
Table 4 Least-cost population size and regression coefficients 
 
Estimated regression coefficients Budget 
item 
F. Sig. B0 B1 B2 
R2 Least-cost 
population 
size 
1 87.66 0.000 748.391 -2.4817 0.0022 0.52 580,000 
2 97.64 0.000 361.667 -1.2749 0.0011 0.55 550,000 
3 68.95 0.000 382.530 -1.1887 0.0013 0.46 550,000 
4 111.74 0.000 2370.62 -8.1799 0.0072 0.58 600,000 
5 113.55 0.000 1693.31 -6.2188 0.0054 0.59 600,000 
6 40.50 0.000 672.076 -1.8456 0.0017 0.34 580,000 
7 108.29 0.000 685.106 -2.4797 0.0022 0.58 580,000 
8 105.30 0.000 658.072 -2.3791 0.0021 0.57 580,000 
9 73.00 0.000 23.2871 -0.0855 0.006 0.48 600,000 
10 101.34 0.000 1122.87 -3.6205 0.0032 0.56 580,000 
11 18.19 0.000 132.999 -0.3688 0.0003 0.59 580,000 
12 50.08 0.000 340.646 -1.0320 0.0009 0.49 580,000 
13 87.53 0.000 269.719 -0.7513 0.0006 0.52 600,000 
14 37.78 0.000 378.249 -1.4698 0.0013 0.32 550,000 
15 81.06 0.000 1240.69 -4.8172 0.0043 0.50 550,000 
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16 40.05 0.000 498.196 -1.9236 0.0016 0.34 600,000 
17 7.62 0.000 103.283 -0.4276 0.0004 0.39 550,000 
18 41.12 0.000 605.779 -2.2647 0.0021 0.34 580,000 
19 12.00 0.0138 123.8982 -1.1311 0.0001 0.23 500,000 
20 14.04 0.019 28.0105 -2.2268 0.0065 0.25 600,000 
21 11.15 0.0319 52.156 -3.123 0.0065 0.21 600,000 
 
Source: Jeju Development Institute  (2004: 144). 
 
Note: 1. Total budget per person, 2. Personnel expense per person, 3. Ongoing cost per person, 4. 
Special project cost per person, 5. Auxiliary project cost per person, 6. Self-auspice project cost per 
person, 7. Total administrative cost per person, 8. Regulation-making and election cost per person, 9. 
General management expenditure per person, 10. Social development cost per person, 11. Education 
and culture cost per person, 12. Health and environment improvement cost per person, 13. Social 
security cost per person, 14. Housing and regional development cost per person, 15. Economic 
development cost per person, 16. Agricultural development cost per person, 17. Regional economy cost 
per person, 18. Resources preservation cost per person, 19. Transport management cost per person, 20. 
Civil defence cost per person, 21. Civil defence management cost per person. 
 
 
The 21 average cost curves all are ‘U’ shaped, and so the optimal (least-cost) 
population corresponding to the lowest point of the ‘U’ curve ranges from 550,000 to 
600,000 (except 500,000 in the case of transport management cost). In other words, 
we can assume that the services in local authorities can be provided at the lowest cost 
where the population of each local authority ranges from 550,000 to 600,000. All 
variables, other than local government population, which may affect the local 
government cost can be assumed to be already evaluated and treated as constants in 
this function.  
 
 
(2) Benefits and costs 
 
Table 3 shows how many savings the potential unitary authority can produce. This 
analysis is based on the assumption that the unitary authority will have been created 
by mid 2006 and will be operating in 2007. As Table 3 indicates, the benefits being 
produced in 2007 are estimated at approximately 1,374.4 hundred million won, and 
account for around 25 per cent of the total running costs of the five local authorities to 
be reorganised, and around 5 per cent of their total budgets.  
 
 
Table 3 Estimated costs and benefits associated with the restructuring by year (unit: one 
hundred million in Korean currency) 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 20`13 2014 2015 2016 
B1 36 72 108 144 180 216 252 288 324 360 
B2  710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 710 
B3  9.4    9.4    9.4  
B4  526.2 526.2 526.2 526.2 526.2      
B5  141.8 141.8 141.8 141.8 141.8 141.8 141.8 141.8 141.8 141.8 
B6  56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 56.5 
B 
Total 
1,499.9 1,506.5 1,542.5 1,578.5 1,623.9 1,124.3 1,160.3 1,196.3 1,241.7 1,268.3
C1 1.65          
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C2 82.5          
C3 5          
C4 10.8          
C5 10          
C6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6      
C 
Total 
115.55 15.6 15.6 15.6 15.6      
B-C 1,374.45 1,480.9 1,536.9 1,562.9 1,618.3 1,124.3 1,603 1,196.3 1,241.7 1,286.3
 
Source: Jeju Development Institute  (2004: 158). 
 
Note 1. B1: savings of personnel expenses, B2: savings of running costs, B3: savings of election costs, 
B4: savings of overlapped facilities, B5: savings of overlapped projects, B6: effect of reduction in 
processing time of customer services, B TOTAL: benefit total, C1: costs to re-enact ordinances, C2: 
costs to rearrange official documents, C3: costs to publicise, C4: costs to replace the road signposts, 
C5: costs to diagnose organisation, C6: costs of loss of community identity, C TOTAL: cost total, B−C: 
benefits−costs. 
 
 
(3) Regional development effects 
 
Table 4 shows how many regional development effects can be produced by the 
savings from reorganisation. As was indicated earlier, we assume that the savings will 
be invested in the construction industry within the newly created unitary authority 
area. As Table 4 shows, the production multiplier effect is estimated at 1,115.5 
hundred million won in 2007 and will increase as time goes on. Employment and 
income multiplier effect will also increase year by year, and the three effects account 
for approximately 20 per cent of the total budgets of the five local authorities in 2007 
only. 
 
 
Table 4 Regional development effects (unit: one hundred million in Korean currency; 
employees) 
 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
P.M 1,155.6 1,311.6 1,359.6 1,407.9 1,468.6 1,504.5 1,552.4 1,600.6 1,661.3 1,696.9
E.M 1,744.5 1,979.9 2,052.6 2,125.3 2,217.0 2,271.1 2,343.4 2,416.2 2,507.8 2,561.6
I.M 1,402.9 1,592.2 1,650.7 1,709.2 1,782.9 1,826.5 1,884.6 1,943.1 2,016.8 2,060.0
Total 4,303 4,883.7 5,062.9 5,242.4 5,468.5 5,602.1 5,780.4 5,959.9 6,185.9 6,318.5
 
Source: Jeju Development Institute  (2004: 156). 
 
Note: P.M.: production multiplier effect, E.M.: employment multiplier effect, I.M.: income multiplier 
effect. 
 
 
V   Policy implications and conclusions 
 
Changing the structure of existing local government would inevitably entail costs and 
produce benefits. In Korea, for instance, it appears that few empirical studies have 
been conducted examining the benefits, whereas most studies on reorganisation 
(except reports from government) emphasise the huge transition costs. This trend also 
applies to the UK. In order to understand what reorganisation can bring to the 
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ordinary citizen, however, not only costs but also benefits should be estimated 
objectively.  
 
In this paper we have presented a framework for estimating the costs and benefits 
associated with local government reorganisation and applied it to Jeju Province in 
Korea. The policy implications from this analysis can be summarised as follows. 
 
One. It appears that, up until now, the benefits arising from local government 
reorganisation have been underestimated, for two possible reasons. The first is the 
belief that they cannot be ascertained without the structure of the newly created 
unitary authority being known. The second is that estimating them precisely is 
assumed to be too difficult. This tendency appears to apply to the UK as well. 
However, analysis of the Jeju Province case shows that the benefits can be quantified, 
despite the limitations.  
 
Two. Economy of scale does exist in public service provision in local government. 
The average cost curve is ‘U’-shaped, and the population corresponding to the lowest 
point of the ‘U’ curve ranges from 550,000 to 600,000. The fact that this minimum 
occurs at a population of between 550,000 and 600,00 indicates that, in the case of 
Jeju Province, we are examining a reorganised unitary authority consisting of that 
population that yields an ‘optimal’ (least-cost) public service to ordinary citizens. It 
also implies that the current 234 district authorities in Korea could be consolidated 
into around forty local authorities. 
 
Three. It is predicted that in the case of Jeju Province, at least 25 per cent of the total 
running costs of the five local authorities (one provincial and four district authorities) 
in question can be saved. This represents a contrast with UK studies. As was 
mentioned earlier, many studies (e.g. Chisholm, 2004; Leach, 1998) conducted in the 
UK emphasise that the higher ongoing costs and transition costs would never be paid. 
Even though this reorganisation plan for Jeju Province has not yet been put into 
practice, the research result was accepted by the workshops and seminars which were 
conducted after the research project was reported. The difference between the Jeju 
case study and the UK studies may arise partly because in the UK the potential 
savings have rarely been estimated in a quantified way in academia and government, 
and partly because sophisticated methodologies have not been applied to quantify 
costs and benefits in relation to restructuring.  
 
Four. It is essential that appropriate methods of valuation of non-market goods such as 
the solution of area-wide regional problems, and the loss of regional identity and 
representation arising from reorganisation, should be used to calculate change in the 
level of non-market goods. For this, choice experiments are recommended. The 
research project conducted for Jeju Province applied the CE method to assess 
qualitatively related non-market goods, including satisfaction with area-wide problem 
solutions, satisfaction with the faster processing of customer services such as licence 
and planning permission, and loss of local identity and political representation. The 
costs arising from loss of local identity on the part of residents within the area was 
estimated at 7.8 billion won in Korean currency (approximately £3.9 million) for the 
five years from 2007.  
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Five. The analysis of the costs and benefits involved in local government 
reorganisation should cover regional development effects by regional Input–Output 
analysis so that the production multiplier, income multiplier and employment 
multiplier effects can be derived. These effects are very important tools whereby 
interested local people can quantify and so easily understand what advantages the 
reorganisation scheme would bring to them. Since the reorganisation process 
inevitably entails tension and conflict between the local interests of communities and 
wider interests (Chisholm, 2004: 114), clear and tangible evidence should be 
presented to make interested local people aware of the benefits and costs arising from 
the reorganisation scheme. In the case of Jeju Province, the Input–Output analysis 
result effectively served to convert opponents into supporters.  
 
In conclusion, what is important in the field of local government reorganisation is that 
further studies should be provided in which the benefits are also estimated and 
included in the analysis table. It appears that, up until now, more documents have 
been provided emphasising the associated costs than documents that objectively 
weigh costs and benefits. For this, a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
analysis is required.  
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